

CURRICULUM VITAE

Jean LAINE

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EDUCATION

- Doctorat d'Etat es Sciences Economiques, University of Rennes, France: "Echanges et Communication: Essai sur l'Optimalité Parétienne dans une Economie d'Echanges" (Trade and Communication: Essay on Pareto Optimality in a Pure Exchange Economy), September 1987
- Agrégation des Universités, Rank 3, 1994

POSITIONS HELD

- 1987-1991: Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Rennes, France
- 1991-1993: Lecturer in Economics, Keele University, United Kingdom
- 1993-1994: Associate Professor of Economics, Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris, France
- 1994-1995: Professor of Economics, Head of the Research Centre in Public Economics and Environment, University of Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, France
- 1995-1998: Professor of Microeconomics, Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique (ENSAE), Paris
- From 1998 to present: Professor of Economics, Head of the Department of Economics, Management, and Social Sciences, Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information (National School of Statistics and Information Analysis, ENSAI), Rennes, France
- From 2009: Professor of Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey
- From September 2010: Director of the Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies (<http://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr>)

RESEARCH FIELDS

- Cooperative Game Theory
- Matching Theory
- Voting and Social Choice Theory
- Models of Market Dynamics

PUBLICATIONS

- 1- Group Decision Making under Uncertainty: A Note on the Aggregation of Ordinal Preferences, *Theory and Decision*, 21, 155-161, 1986
- 2- Processus d'Echanges bilatéraux et Auto-organisation du Marché », *Economie Appliquée*, 27, 41-61, 1989
- 3- Finitely Optimal Allocations in Countable Large-Square Exchange Economies », *Economics Letters*, 35, 1-4, 1991

- 4- On the Nash Equilibrium Property of an Auction Matching Game » , *Economics Letters*, Vol. 38, 399-403, 1992
- 5- On Nash Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria in a Market for Pure Indivisibles Without Money, *Ricerche Economiche*, 1, No 4, 1993
- 6- Weak Covering Relations in Tournaments, *Theory and Decision*, 37, 245-265, 1994
- 7- On Regular Composed Tournaments, in *Models and Experiments on Risk and Rationality*, M.Machina, B.Munier (Eds), Kluwer, 1995
- 8- Composition-consistent Tournament Solutions and Social Choice Functions, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 13, 75-93, 1996
- 9- A General Theorem on Representative Democracy, in *Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice*, H. de Swart (ed), Tilburg University Press, 504-521, 1999
- 10- Un Modèle Dynamique de Compétition Électorale, in *Décision, Prospective, Auto-organisation*, J. Thépot, M. Godet, F. Roubelat, A.E. Saab(eds), 425-454, Dunod, 2000
- 11- Majority Voting on Orders, *Theory and Decision*, 49, 251-289, 2000
- 12- Representation in Majority Tournaments, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 39 (1), 35-55, 2000
- 13- Surfing on the Net as a Source of Market Segmentation, *Communication and Strategies* , 40, 125 –137, 2000
- 14- Forums de consommation sur Internet : une approche évolutionniste, *Revue économique*, 52, 119-135, 2001
- 15- Cognitive Efficiency of Social Networks Providing Consumption Advice on Experience Goods, in *Cognitive Economics*, P. Bourguine, J.P Nadal (eds), Springer, 2004
- 16- Communautés Epistémiques : Organisation du travail et efficacité, *Revue d'Economie Politique*, 113, 183-203, 2004
- 17- Single-switch Preferences and the Ostrogorski Paradox, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 52, 49-66, 2006
- 18- The Budget-Voting Paradox, *Theory and Decision*, 64, 447-478, 2008,
- 19- Condorcet Choice and the Ostrogorski Paradox, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 32, 317-333, 2009
- 20- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfil the Electorate's Will?, in *Handbook on Approval Voting*, Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds) , Heidelberg: Springer, 2010
- 21- The Core of Shapley-Scarf Markets with Couples, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 47, 60-67, 2011
- 22- Choosing a Committee: Approval Balloting and the Search for a Compromise, forthcoming in *Group Decision and Negotiation*, DOI 10.1007/s10726-010-9226-2, 2011
- 23- Unanimity and the Anscombe's Paradox, forthcoming in *TOP*, 2011
- 24- Pareto-Efficiency in Multiple Referendum, forthcoming in *Theory and Decision*, 2011

WORK IN PROGRESS

- 1) Electing Pareto-optimal Committees from Approval Ballots
- 2) Triple-consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule
- 3) Kemeny Stable Social Welfare Functions
- 4) Self-selective Social Welfare Functions
- 5) Party Competition and The Referendum Paradox

TEACHING ACTIVITY
Academic Year 2011-2012

Fall semester

- EC 501.01 Advanced Microeconomics I (Master and PhD in Economics)
- EC 617 Directed Readings in Microeconomics

Spring semester

- EC 501.02 Advanced Microeconomics II (Master and PhD in Economics)
- EC 617 Directed Readings in Microeconomics (?)